C. G. Eklund dba C. G. Eklund Electric Company v. Clinton L. Elwell : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1949
C. G. Eklund dba C. G. Eklund Electric Company v.
Clinton L. Elwell : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ira A. Huggins; Attorney for Defendant and Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Eklund v. Elwell, No. 7256 (Utah Supreme Court, 1949).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/989
7256 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
C. if. EKLUND. doing business under the 
name of: 
C. G. EKLUND ELECTRIC COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Rt!spondent, No. 7256 
v. 
CLINTON L. ELWELL. 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from Second District Court, 
Weber County, Utah 
Honorable john A. Hendricks, judge 
IRA A. HUGGINS 
. • ·"-~! 1:! 13'-9 Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
. ...-.-------------------------~ 
ClEBK. SUPREME CCUR~UTAH 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX, General 
Pag·e 
Statement of Case .... ·--··-···--··-·-···-·····-·······-·-------···----········-·--···-··-----·- 1 
Assignment of Errors_·--····-···························-·····-----·····-··---·-··-······--· 7 
Point No. l. Defendant's Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint 
should have been sustained .............................................................. ! 0 
Point No. 2. The Admission of Evidence Concerning an 
Alleged Agency Between Plaintiff and the Interpleaded 
Plaintiff and Hearsay statements that Interpleaded Plaintiff 
was Foreman of the Plaintiff on Defendant's job ______________________ 17 
Point No. 3. The Trial Court Erred in Its Refusal To Grant 
Defendant's Motion For Non-Suit as Against the Plaintiff.. _____ .! 9 
Points Nos. 4, 5 and 6. Insufficiency of Competent Evidence 
to Support or Warrant The Amended Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law and judgment and Refusal of Court to Grant 
Defendant a New TriaL ....... ___________________________________________________________ 20 
INDEX OF CASES 
Citation Page 
12 Am. Juris, Contracts, Sec. 159, Page 655 __________________________________ 11 
12 Am. juris. Contracts, Sec. 160 ____________________________________________________ 15 
Baker v. Latses, 60 Utah, 38, 206 Pac. 553 ..... ·-··---------------·-····-·····15 
Brown v. Markland, 16 Utah 360, 52 Pac. 597 ______________________________ 19 
Elliott on Con tracts, Sec. 1413 ___ ·····--·-··--···--··-----·--··-------··-··-·---------12 
Farrer v. Atlas Acceptance Corp., 92 Pac. (2) 729 _______________ ....... 15 
Fritz v. Western Union ~el. Co., 25 U. 263, 71 Pac. 209. _____________ 13 
Haddock v. Salt Lake City, 23 Utah 527, 65 Pac. 491.. ....... _________ 15 
Hiramatsen v. Maryland Ins. Co., 273 Pac. 963 ____________________________ 13 
jensen v. Howell, 75 U. 64, 282 P. 1034 ........ _______________________________ .22 
Montgomery v. Rief, 15 U. 501, 50 Pac. 625 ___________________________ ....... 12 
Sayward v. Dexter-Horton & Co., 72 Fed. 758, 19 C. C. A. 176 .... 19 
Smith v. Bowman, 32 Utah 33, 88 Pac. 687 __________________________________ 19 
U. C. A., 1943, Sec. 104-3- L--------·-·-------··-··--··------·--·-····-------···-·---·····13 
U. C. A., 1943, Sec. 79-5A-L _______________________________________________ .t 3, 16, 20 
U. C. A., 1943, Sec. 79-5A-2 ______________________________________________________________ 14 
U. C. A., 1943, Sec. 79-5A-3 ________________________________________________________________ 14 
U. C. A., 1943, Sec. 79-5A-10 ......... ___________________________________________________ 14 
Western Union Tel. Co., v. Mathews, 74 U. 280 Pac. 729 ________ 19, 22 
Yowell's Estate, 75 U. 312, 285 Pac. 285 .. _____________________________________ .22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
G-
c. it. EKLUND, doing business under the 
name of: 
C. G. EKLUND ELECTRIC COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, No. 7256 
v. 
CLINTON L. ELWELL, 
Defendant and Appellant: 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought this action against the defendant to re-
cover the sum of $1,499.05 for labor claimed to have been per-
formed and materials claimed furnished the defendant at his 
special instance and request by the plaintiff, and plaintiff claims 
defendant agreed to pay for said labor and materials. (It is not 
alleged whom to upon what basis he promised to pay.) 
The labor performed and material furnished were in con-
nection with the installat.ion of certain electrical wiring, parts 
and equipment in a service station at 757 Washington Boulevard, 
Ogden, Utah; and it is alleged that the work was done and the 
materials furnished in the name of Empey Electric Company 
for plaintiff's benefit, that the work was completed on or about 
February 7, 1947, and that a statement was submitted in the 
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name of Empey Electric Company, but for plaintiff's use and 
benefit. Plaintiff alleges that Empey Electric Company claimed 
no interest in the sum owing and that plaintiff had paid for said 
labor and materials (although it is not stated whom plaintiff 
claims to have paid). Plaintiff claimed to be the legal owner 
and holder of the claim. (Bill of Exceptions, Page 001). 
A general demurrer was filed to the complaint. (Bill of Ex-
ceptions, Page 004). And the same was over-ruled. (Bill of Ex-
ceptions, Page 005). 
Defendant answered said complaint, denying the allega-
tions of the complaint, alleging that by virtue of a verbal agree-
ment with one H. B. Empey, doing business as Empey Electric 
Company, the said labor was performed and materials were 
furnished by him (Empey) at an agreed upon price of $750.00, 
less an offset for certain moneys due and owing defendant by 
Empey, the balance to· be paid Empey at the completion of the 
verbal contract. 
Defendant alleges Empey agreed to perform all the labor 
and furnish all the materials in and about the wiring of a ser-
vice station at 757 Washington Boulevard, in Ogden and in-
cluding a garage at said address, and also including wiring 
three gasoline pumps and a flood light adjacent to the service 
station; that the material to be furnished included all conduits, 
all switch boxes and plugs, including one master switch and all 
wire. All materials were to be new and first class and labor to be 
performed in a good,· safe and workman-like manner and so 
as to pass city inspection. (Bill of Exceptions, Page 015). 
Defendant alleged (and it was admitted at the trial) that 
plaintiff had nothing to do at all with the original contract, and 
that all the labor was performed and materials were furnished 
by and under the control and supervision of H. B. Empey, and 
that plaintiff, so far as defendant knew, claimed no interest in 
_ the contract until long after Empey discontinued work at the 
job. (Bill of Exceptions, Pages 007 and 017). 
2 
I 
( 
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Defendant alleged that after the contract was let and most 
of the work done, plaintiff and Empey conspired one with the 
other for plaintiff to claim the benefits of the contract in order 
to defeat defendant's offset against the alleged agreed upon 
price. (Bill of Exceptions, _Page 007). 
And defendant prayed the court to interplead Empey as a11 
interpleaded plaintiff for a complete, speedy and adequate ad-
judication of the claims of all parties involved. (Bill of Excep-
tions, Page 008); and by order of the court H. B. Empey was 
interpleaded (Bill of Exceptions, Page 009). He filed a general 
denial jointly with plaintiff. (Bill of Exceptions, Page 021). 
In defendant's amended answer he alleged that Empey failed 
and neglected to complete his verbal contract in this, that he 
failed and refused to furnish plug boxes with covers to make 
them safe to his damage in the sum of $5.70; wired the gasoline 
pumps so as to leave the same open to the spilling of gasoline, 
constituting a fire hazard, and would not pass inspection, to his 
damage in the sum of $65.00; that he did not extend the wiring 
to the flood light to his damage in the sum of $12.50. Defendant 
claimed an agreed upon offset against Empey in the sum of 
$137.23 for gas and oil theretofore furnished, $6.50 for a ther-
mostat, $12.50 for defective wiring of a gas furnace by Empey, 
and for which he was paid; for $46.95 for a fluorescent lighting 
fixture purchased by defendant from Empey and paid for but 
not delivered, and for $23.55 in addition, paid to Empey by 
defendant for work he had failed to perform. (Bill of Excep-
tions, Pages 015 and 016). Defendant claimed an offset against 
Empey in the total of $252.19, leaving a balance due him in the 
sum of $497.81 (Bill of Excepti.ons, Page 017), which said sum 
defendant alleged Empey agreed to accept, and that the de-
fendant had at all times stood ready to pay upon completion 
of the contract. 
Defendant filed a reply denying the joint allegations of 
plaintiff and interpleaded plaintiff to the effect that all sums 
owing from Empey to defendan-t had been paid. (Bill of Excep-
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tions, Page 022). 
The case w'ent to trial before the Honorable John A. Hen-
dricks, one of the judges of the Second Judicial Court, sitting 
without a jury, on the 13th day of April, 1948, resulting in a 
judgment against defendant and in favor of plaintiff in the 
sum of $1 ,499.00, the exact amount demanded, with interest and 
eosts. (Bill of Exceptions, Page 026). 
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, and after argu-
ments were heard, the judgment was amended by allowing de-
fendant an offset against the interpleaded plaintiff Empey in 
the sum of $137.23 without interest, thereby reducing the judg-
ment against defendant to $1,361.82 with interest and costs. (Bill 
of Exceptions, Pages 031 and 032). 
A brief resume of the evidence is as follows: 
The Eklund Electric Company is the plaintiff. Mr. H. B. 
Empey, Interpleaded Plaintiff, and a Mr. Shaw (Gilbert) and a 
Mr. Mumford did the work on this defendant's job. They com-
menced in August, 1946, and finished in February, 1947. (Bill 
of Exceptions, Pages 4 and 5). Plaintiff did not go out to the 
job, but Mr. Empey went out about every morning. They took 
the materials from plaintiff's shop, but it was taken to defen-
dant's service station by Mr. Empey, who supervised and as-
sisted in the work daily. (Bill of Exceptions, Page 7). Empey 
always outlined the work. Plaintiff never did outline or do any 
of the work, (Bill of Exceptions, Pages 8 and 9). Mr. Shaw 
checked over the work, which he testified he and the other men 
did for interpleaded plaintiff, Mr. Empey, which he said corres-
ponded with plaintiff's Exhibit "A". (Bill of Exceptions, Page 
11). Each and every page in plaintiff's Exhibit "A" is signed 
"H. B. Empey", with no reference whatsoever to plaintiff. 
The Eklund Electric Company place of business was at 
309-24th Street in Ogden, over sixteen blocks from defendant's 
job. Exhibit "A" consists of weekly time sheets turned in by 
interpleaded plaintiff, Empey, and in his handwriting. The esti-
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' 
mated cost of the electrical work on defendant's job by Builders, 
Inc., the general contractor, was $750.00 (see defendant's Ex-
hibit 2). The only statement furnished defendant was on May 
29, 1947, and headed "Empey Electric Company", Ogden, Utah. 
(See defendant's Exhibit ( 1) .) (Bill of Exceptions, Page 28). 
Interpleaded plaintiff had been previously working for defen-
dant and submitted him a statement of this work as of August 
6, 1946, on "Empey Electric Co." statement. (See defendant's 
Exhibit .(3).) (Also see defendant's Exhibits (4) and (5).) 
As a matter of fact, all of the transactions (and there were 
many) before the contract which forms the basis of this action 
had been between the interpleaded plaintiff Empey and the 
defendant. (Bill of Exceptions, Pages 50, 51 and 52). 
Plaintiff admitted that Mr. Empey did this job. (Bill of 
Exceptions, Page 15). Evidence was admitted to show the rea-
sonable value of the labor performed and materials furnished in 
the amounts sued for. The plaintiff admitted he was not a lic-
ensed electrical contractor during this job, but that Mr. Empey 
was a licensed electrical contractor under the name of Empey 
Electric Company. (Bill of Exceptions, Page 20). The permit to 
do the defendant's job was taken out and issued by Ogden City 
to Empey Electric Company, and plaintiff had no negotiations 
with the defendant concerJ?ing this job. In fact, he never did 
talk to the defendant until "after the job was just about com-
pleted," (Bill of Exceptions,. Page 21) or after it was completed. 
He had no agreement with defendant concerning prices or costs. 
He never did submit a statement to defendant, neither before, 
at the time of or after completion of the work. Plaintiff claims 
he stopped in at the .job as he went by on a few occasions, but 
that he never did see defendant there. (Bill of Exceptions, Page 
22). 
The union scale of wages for electricians was $1.62Yz per 
hour. Contractors selling hourly wage scale was $2.25. (Bill of 
Exceptions, Pages 23, 40 and 43). The hourly wage scale for 
laborers was 75c, and the contractor's selling price $1.25. (Bill 
of Exceptions, Pages 24, 40 and 43). No 0. P. A. prices of ma-
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terials were produced or offered. Plaintiff kept no records on 
this job except as they were handed to him, presumably by 
Empey. (Bill of Exceptions, Page 26). 
Defendant refused to pay plaintiff anything upon being 
called by him, for the reason that he had no dealings with him; 
that his dealings were all with Empey; that Empey owed him 
some money which he was going to deduct. (Bill of Exceptions, 
Pages 30 and 33). 
There was some hearsay evidence claiming that Empey was 
plaintiff's agent, none of which was legally admissable. (Bill of 
Exceptions, Pages 36 and 37). The contract was negotiated at 
defendant's office, 20th Street and Washington Boulevard and 
at' 757 Washington Boulevard between Empey, Interpleaded 
Plaintiff, defendant and a representative of the general con-
tractor, with whom Empey che·cked the plans. (Bill of Excep-
tions, Pages 47 and 48). Empey admitted examining defendant's 
Exhibit (2), including the estimated cost of wiring, but denied 
he agreed to do the work for $750.00. (Bill of Exceptions, Pages 
49 and 61). He admitted doing work previously for defendant 
and receiving the pay and receipting for it. (Bill of Exceptions, 
Page 49), and said defendant "called me to do it" (this job), 
(Bill of Exceptions, Page 55), and admitted that defendant 
asked for the price of $750.00 when they were checking the 
general contractor's estimates, (Bill of Exceptions, Page 61), 
and that he used the general contractor's plans and specifica-
tions on the job. (Bill of Exceptions, Page 63) . 
.Murphy-Neill Electric Co., were called in to complete part 
of the work contracted by Empey, (Bill of Exceptions, Page 66), 
rewire the pumps left in dangerous conditions (Bill of Excep-
tions, Pages 67 and 68). His reasonable costs were $88.30 (.Bill 
of Exceptions, Page 70). (See also Exhibit 8). 
T. E. Meyers, City Electrical Inspector, inspected pumps 
after Empey left the job and found them improperly wired. He 
notified Empey and defendant that they would have to be re-
wired (Bill of Exceptions, Page 74). The city looked to Empey 
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to do this work because he took out the permit (Bill of Excep-
tions, Page 75). 
Defendant received one bid on the job from Charley W. 
Goodsell for $750.00 complete, but Goodsell did not have the 
pipe. He testified that that bid was before him and Empey when 
they negotiated the contract and that Empey said he would do 
it for that much and save defendant money, including all the 
labor and materials (Bill of Exceptions, Pages 80, 81 and 82). 
Defendant requested at that time that he offset the amounts 
Empey owed him, and Empey said, "It could be arranged" (Bill 
of ~xceptions, Page 82). The amounts claimed owing by Empey 
to defendant are itemized at Page 85 of the Bill of Exceptions. 
Defendant testified he had no contract with plaintiff and 
no dealings with him at all until after the job was completed 
(Bill of Exceptions, Page 91). All his prior dealings had been 
with Empey (Bill of Exceptions, Pages 92 and 93); that the 
representative of Builders, Inc. of Ogden present when Empey 
took the contract was Andrew Isakson, who testified that he 
was president and general manager of Builders, Inc. of Ogden; 
that he prepared the estimate of the costs of defendant's service 
station and garage and, based upon information obtained from 
electricians, fixed the electrical costs at $750.00; that Mr. Good-
sell offered to do the electrical work for $750.00; that he was 
present at a conference between Empey and defendant at de-
fendant's office at 20th Street and Washington Boulevard about 
in july, 1946. He testified that defendant asked· Empey if he 
had the necessary materials and if he could do the job for the 
$750.00 estimate, and he said he could and probably for less, 
and that at that time it was agreed that Empey ~hould do the 
job for said sum (Bill of Exceptions, Pages 108 to 112, incl.). 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERRORS 
Appellant makes and assigns the following errors, upon 
which he relies for a reversal of the judgment appealed from 
and as a basis for a direction from this court to the t·rial court 
to make and enter a judgment as prayed by the defendant, to-
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wit: 
1. That the complaint does not state facts sufficient to 
constitute a cause of action (Bill of Exceptions, Page 001). 
2. The tri~ll court erred in overruling defendant's demurrer 
(Bill of Exceptions, Pages 004 and 005). 
3. The trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion 
for non-suit as against the plaintiff (Bill of Exceptions, Page 
65). 
4. The trial court erred in admitting evidence on behalf 
of plaintiff (Question No. 7 on Page 36, Bill of Exceptions) as 
follows: "Question: And Mr. Eklund said you were the foreman 
on his jobs. Is that right? Answer: Yes;" (Also Question No. 10 
on Page 36 of the Bill of Exceptions) "Question: And you were 
his foreman on the job that was done on the Elwell property?" 
and the answer, "That is correct," all of which were objected 
to by the defendant. 
5. The trial court erred in making and entering its Find-
ing of Fact, being Paragraph No. 2 of the amended Findings of 
Fact, as follows, to-wit: "That at Ogden, Utah, on or about 
August 16, 1946, the plaintiff at the special instance and request 
of the defendant and upon his promise to pay therefor did fur-
nish material and labor in installing certain electric wiring, parts 
and equipment in a gas station at 737 Washington Avenue in 
said city and state; that the said material was furnished and 
labor was performed in the name of Empey Electric Company 
for plaintiff's benefit, and that plaintiff was an undiscovered 
principal until on or about the month of November 1946, * and 
that the defendant knew that the plaintiff was the real party 
in interest as aforesaid. That it was for plaintiff's use and bene-
fit and said Empey Electric Company claims no right or interest 
in the sum owing." (Bill of Exceptions, Page 030). 
6. The court erred in making and entering its Finding of 
Fact No. 3 of the Amended Findings of Fact as follows, to-wit: 
"That during said time above-mentioned the standard and· es-
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tablished scale of wages for an electrician in Ogden, Utah, was 
$2.25 per hour, and for an electrician apprentice $1.25 per hour; 
and said scales were approved and established under the OPA 
law and regulations made therefor; *that the sums charged 
for said material were also reasonable therefor, and the hours 
set forth above were reasonable and were necessary to com-
plete the said work as aforesaid, and the defendant promised 
to pay for the same.'' (Bill of Exceptions, Page 030). 
7. The trial court erred in making and entering its Find-
ing of Fact No. 5 of the Amended Findings of Fact as fol-
lows: "And the court further finds that the allegations of de-
fendent's amended answer are untrue and are not supported . 
by the preponderance of the evidence*" (Bill of Exceptions, 
Page 030). 
8. That the trial Court erred in its conclusion of law "That 
the plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendant in 
the sum of $1361.82 together with interest thereon" *as set 
forth therein. 
9. That the court erred in denying the motion of appellant 
for a new trial (Bill of Exceptions, Page 029). , 
10. That the trial court erred in rendering judgment in 
favor of the respondent and against the appellant (Bill of Ex-
ceptions, Page 031). 
QUESTIONS INVOLVED 
l. The trial court's refusal to sustain defendant's demurrer 
to the complaint. A discussion of this involves Assignments of 
Error No. l and 2. 
2. The admission of evidence concerning an alleged agen-
cy between plaintiff and the interpleaded plaintiff and hear-
say statements that interpleaded plaintiff was foreman of the 
plaintiff on defendant's job. This involves a discussion of As-
signment of Error No. 3 ·and 4. 
3. The trial court's refusal to grant defendant's motion 
for non-suit as against the plaintiff. This involves a discussion 
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of defendant's Assignment of Error No. 3. 
4. Insufficiency of competent evidence to support or 
warrant the Amended Findings of Fact complained of. This 
involves a discussion of defendant's Assignments of Error No. 5, 
6 and 7. 
5. The conclusion of law that plaintiff was entitled to 
judgment and the· rendering of judgment in favor of the re-
spondent and against the appellant. This involves defendant's 
Assignment of Error No. 8, 9 and 10. 
6. The refusal of the court to grant defendant a new trial. 
This involves defendant's Assignment of Error No.9 and 10. 
The Assignments of Error overlap and run together in some 
instances, but so far as possible the assignments will be dis-
cussed in the order grouped above. 
ARGUMENT 
1.' DEFENDANT'S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COM-
PLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUSTAINED. 
The charging part of the complaint, so far as material, 
reads: 
"That at Ogden, Utah, on or about August 16, 1946, the plain-
tiff at the special instance and request of the defendant and 
upon his promise to pay therefor did furnish material and la-
bor*; that the said material was fur.nished and labor was per-
formed in the name of the Empey Electric Company for plain-
tiff's benefit; *that a statement was thereafter submitted to 
the defendant for said material and labor in the name of Empey 
Electric Company; that it was for plaintiff's use and benefit, 
and said Empey Electric Company claims no right or interest 
in the sum owing.*" It will be noted that all of the allegations 
set out in behalf of plaintiff are not statements of fact but are 
conclusions. At the outset it is claimed that plaintiff furnished 
material and labor "at the special instance and request of the 
defendant." Then follows the contradictory statement "that 
the said· material was furnished and labor was performed in 
10 
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the name of Empey Electric Company for plaintiff's benefit" 
and the further statement that "a statement was thereafter sub-
mitted to the defendant for said material and labor in the name 
of Empey Electric Company and that it was for plaintiff's use 
and benefit," there being no statement of fact or at all as to 
who Empey Electric Company was, whether it was an individual, 
a partnership or otherwise, or whether plaintiff had any con-
nection whatsoever with the Empey Electric Company. Then 
appears the unusual conclusion that "said Empey Electric Com-
pany claims no right or interest in the sum owing." There are 
no facts set forth that plaintiff is in any position to substan-
tiate that statement. Empey Electric Company is not a party 
to the suit at that stage of the proceeding; and based upon 
the allegations of the complaint, there is no statement of facts 
upon which Empey Electric Company would be precluded after 
the entry of judgment from very well claiming the benefits 
of the alleged claim. In other words, we have a suit filed by 
A against B, based upon an alleged contract or arrangement 
between B and C, C not being a party to the suit, and A claim-
ing the benefits of the said contract or arrangement, and A 
claiming that C, a stranger to the action, claims no benefits 
therein; yet all of the business was transacted, the material and 
labor furnished and statements submitted to B by C. Agency 
is not alleged factually, neither as undisclosed _principal and 
agent or otherwise. No assignments from C to A is alleged; 
in fact, no statement of fact appears in the complaint, directly 
or indirectly, upon which plaintiff's alleged claim against the 
defendant could be substantiated; there are no facts alleged 
which, as shown upon the face of the pleading, defendant could 
contravert or admit but only conclusions. The deficiency in 
the complaint seems to be so apparent that no authorities need 
be cited to sustain defendant's position. The complaint does 
not set forth facts from which it could be ascertained whether 
plaintiff claimed a contract directly between plaintiff and de-
fendant as appears from the first sentence in Paragraph No. 2 
of the complaint as follows: 
"2. That at Ogden, Utah, on or about August 16, 
11 
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1946, the plaintiff at the special instance and reqt1 'f the 
defendant and upon his promise to pay therefor. d furn-
ish material.and labor in installing certain electr .at wiring, 
parts and equipment in the erection of a gas station at 
No. 737 Washington Avenue, in said city and state.'' 
or whether he claims that the contract was made between de-
fendant and Empey Electric Co., for plaintiff's benefit; or 
whether he claims to have been the undisclosed principal of 
Empey Electric Co. 
If, as alleged, the materials and labor were furnished and 
performed by plaintiff direct, and at defendant's special instance 
and request from plaintiff, then why were they furnished in the 
name .of Empey Electric Co.? Why was the statement furnished 
and demand made in the name of Empey Electric Co.? If plain-
tiff claimed as a third party for whose interest the contract was 
made, the allegation is insufficient because it did not plead the 
contract showing the intent of the parties when they agreed, 
if they did, to benefit plaintiff. . 
In Elliott on Contracts, Sec. 1413 it is said: 
"It is a rule of practically universal application that 
there must exist on the part of the original parties to the 
contract a clear intent to benefit the third party. Many of 
the cases in addition to holding that there must be an in-
tent to benefit the third party, place a further limitation 
on the rule to the effect that the promisee must owe some 
obligation to the third party." 
And in Montgomery v. Rief, 15 U. 501, 50 Pac. 625, this court 
said: 
"To entitle a third party, who may be benefited by 
the performance of a contract, to sue, there must have 
been an intention on the part of the contracting parties 
to secure some direct benefit to him, or there must be 
some privity and some obligation or duty from the promi-
sor to the third party, which will enable him to enforce 
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~on tract, or some equitable claim to the benefit resulting 
f 1m the promise or performance of the contract, and there 
mt..6\;,. be some legal right on the part of the third party 
to adopt and claim the benefit of the promise or contract." 
No such facts are pleaded. 
In Hiramatsen v. Maryland Ins. Co., 273 Pac. 963, this 
court said: 
"It is merely alleged that they ''are real parties in in 
terest. But not anything is, nor are there any facts, alleged 
to show wherein or in what particular either of them was 
a party in interest when the action was· commenced. That 
was essential if the defendant desired to tender an issue 
in such respect." ** "It merely averred the conclusion that 
they were the real parties in interest." 
That is exactly what the plaintiff did here. 
"The objection that the plaintiff in an action is not 
the real party in interest, as required by the Code, ( 104-3-1, . 
U. C. A., 1943) when available by way of defense, must be 
raised by demurrer or answer, or it will be considered to 
have been waived." Fritz v. Western Union Tel. Co. 25 U. 
263, 71 Pac. 209, and cases therein cited. 
It should further be noted that while the compaint sets 
forth transactions between the defendant and Empey, sufficient 
to justify the conclusion that the relationship of construction 
contractor and contractee existed between them, nowhere in the 
complaint is there any allegation whatsoever that either Empey 
or the plaintiff was licensed by the State of Utah to enter into 
such contract. Section 79-SA-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, co-partner-
ship, corporation, association or other organization or any 
combination of any thereof, to engage in the business or 
act in the capacity of contractor within this state without 
having a license therefor, as herein provided, unless such 
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person, firm, co-partnership, corporation, association or 
other organization is particularly exempted, as provided in 
this act." 
The following section, numbered 79;5A-2, sets forth the exemp-
tions, none of which cover the fact in this case; and Section 79-
5A-3 defines can tractor as follows: 
"A contractor within the meaning of this act is a per-
son, firm, co-partnership, corporation, association or other 
organization or any combination of any thereof who for 
a fixed sum, price, percentage or other compensation other 
than wages, undertakes with another for the construction, 
alteration, repair, addition to or improvement of any build-
ing * or other structure, project, development or improve-
ment * provided that the term contractor, as used in this 
act, shall include sub-contractor but shall not include any-
one who merely furnishes materials or supplies without 
fabricating the same in to or consuming the same in the 
performance of the work of the contractor as herein de-
fined." 
For penalty for violation of Act see 79-5A-10, U. C. A. 43. 
And then the following section sets forth the regulations and 
qualifications of persons applying for licenses. We think, since 
the statute makes it unlawful for a person to act in the capacity 
of a contractor without first obtaining a license therefor, it is 
incumbent upon the plaintiff to plead in his initial pleading 
that the contractor, whoever it was who made the contract, 
did the work and supplied the materials, was qualified by being 
licensed by authorities, otherwise the alleged contract is void. 
12 Am. Jur., Contracts, Section 159, Page 655, where it is 
said: 
"So far as contracts in violation are concerned, it may 
be s1:1id, speaking generally, that there is no distinction be-
tween acts mala in se and acts mala prohibita. Where a 
statute intends to prohibit an act, it must be held that its 
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violation is illegal without regard to the reason of the inhi-
bition, to the morality or immorality of the act, or to the ig-
norance of the parties as to the prohibiting statute." 
And in Section 160 of the same work it is said, 
"An agreement directly and explicitly prohibited by 
a constitutional statute in unmistakable language is or-
dinarily void (citing a long list of cases), and no recovery 
can be had thereon." 
And this court held in Baker v. Latses, 60 Utah 38, 206 Pac. 
553, that 
"It is the generally accepted doctrine of this country 
that every contract in violation of law is void. It is equally 
true that our courts will not lend their aid to the enforce-
ment of nor permit a recovery of compensation under con-
tracts made and entered into in violation of the law pro-
hibiting them or declaring them to be unlawful." citing 
cases, including Haddock v. Salt Lake City, 23, Utah 527, 
65 Pac. 491. 
We submit the alleged contract must show upon its face (in 
the pleading) relying upon it, that it was a lawful contract. 
While we have found no case directly in point under our 
statutes, we think the case of Farrer v. Atlas Acceptance Corp., 
92 Pac. (2) 729, founded on our usury statute, is analogos, 
where this court said, 
"It is to be observed the complaint does not state where 
the contract was made nor the domicile of either plaintiff 
or the j. B. Burnham Company, the assignor of the con-
tract. It is alleged that the interest is in excess of the ten 
per cent per annum allowed. The allegations of the com-
plaint show that the contract to be usurious and void if 
made in or subject to the laws of Utah or a place where a 
like law prevails. Where plaintiff resided or now resides 
or by what law the lending corporation was organized we 
are not advised from the complaint or otherwise, it being 
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·not only easy but necessary to bring the cause under Utah 
law to allege that the contract was made or is subject to 
the Utah law; and failing in this, the complaint fails to 
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The 
demurrer (general) to the complaint should have been sus-
tained. The cause is remanded to the trial court with direc-
tions to sustain the demurrer and to dismiss the action uri-
less plaintiff elects to amend." 
Justice Wolfe in a concurring opinion went even further 
and said that 
"I concur but I do not conceive that the complaint 
would have stated a good cause of action had it alleged 
the domicil~ of the plaintiff or the J. B. Burnham Com-
pany. Again it would have been uncertain as to where the 
contract was made. Even if it were alleged that the plain-
tiff and the Burnham Company were both domiciled in 
Utah, there is nothing from which it can be necessarily im-
plied that the contract was made here." 
It appears to the writer that the instant case is actually a 
stronger case than the case above quoted from for the reason 
that all of the allegations necessary to bring the instant case 
within the jurisdiction of the Utah statute, that is, the contract 
is alleged to have been made in Utah and performed in Utah 
with plaintiff and defendant domiciled in Utah. Hence, under 
Section 79-SA-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, the con tract was 
unlawful unless the contractor had theretofore procured a li-
cense to enter into the same, and contract fails to allege 'that 
the party whoever it was, plaintiff or Empey, acting "in the capa-
city of contractor within this state" ·had a license therefor, as 
.provided by statute. In the Farrer case there is nothing alleged 
bringing the case within the Utah statute on usury. In the in-
stant case everything is alleged bringing the contract within 
the Utah statute, providing for the licensing of contractors, 
but nothing alleged showing the contractor qualified to enter 
into the contract. 
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2. THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING AN 
ALLEGED AGENCY BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND THE IN-
TERPLEADED PLAINTIFF AND HEARSAY STATEMENTS 
THAT INTERPLEADED PLAINTIFF WAS FOREMAN OF 
THE PLAINTIFF ON DEFENDANT,.S JOB. 
The questions and answers complained of, found on Pages 
36 and 37 of the Bill of Exceptions, are as follows: 
1
'Q. And Mr. Eklund said you were the foreman on 
his job. Is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Huggins: Object to that as being hearsay. 
Mr. Nelson: I am asking him if that is correct. 
Mr. Huggins: Was it stated in Mr. Elwell's presence? 
Do you claim that? 
"The Court: What was your question? 
Mr. Nelson: I said that Mr. Eklund had stated that he 
was his foreman, and I asked him if that was correct. 
Mr. Huggins: That is hearsay. 
The Court: Objection overruled. 
MR. HUGGINS EXCEPTION. 
Q. And were you his foreman on the job that was 
done on the Elwell property? 
A. That is correct. 
Mr. Huggins: Object to that as calling for a conclusion 
of the witness and ask that the answer be stricken until I 
get a ruling on the objectio,-t. Now, whether he was a fore-
man or not depends on the facts in the case. 
The Court: Oh, just as far as his statement is conce~ned 
it may stand. Objection overruled." ' 
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Nowhere is it claimed that the statements of plaintiff to Empey 
were made in the presence of the defendant but were purely 
hearsay. The manifest purpose ·of the questions and answers was 
to show the relationship of principal and agent between plain-
tiff and Empey so ~hat plaintiff could claim the benefits of the 
contract. Nowhere in the record is there any evidence of an 
assignment from Empey, who negotiated the contract, whatever 
it was, to the plaintiff. Hence plaintiff's only other possibility 
of claiming the benefits of the contract was on the theory that 
he was Empey's undisclosed principal when the contract was 
entered into, as found by the court in Paragraph 2 of the 
Amended Findings of Fact "that the said material was furnished 
and labor was performed in the name of Empey Electric Com-
pany for plaintiff's benefit; and that plaintiff was an undis-
closed principal until on or about the month of November, 1946." 
Nowhere in the record do we find any factual statement to 
show any connection between plaintiff and Empey at the time 
the contract was concluded between Empey and the defendant. 
It should be pointed out what a convenient arrangement plain-
tiff and Empey have contrived to i111pose upon the defendant; 
if the kind of evidence offered and received in this case is to be 
allowed to stand. Plaintiff stands in a position to deny any 
connection with Empey if Empey makes a bad contract, which 
he apparently did if the costs of labor and material submitted 
by him are reasonable. Plaintiff also stands in a position to 
deny the liabilities of a contract entered into between Empey 
and defendant, because defendant had no negotiations and 
concluded no contract with plaintiff; and self-serving state-
ments made between plaintiff and Empey out of the presence 
and hearing of the defendant and inferences which may be 
drawn therefrom become then the basis for a finding that 
Empey was the undisclosed agent of Eklund. Otherwise, Eklund 
can show no interest in the contract whatsoever, and apparently 
on plaintiff's theory, he should not be bound by the arrange-
ments made between Empey and the defendant as to price, 
offsets, etc. Minus the hearsay statements inferences and con-
clusions made by plaintiff and Empey, there could be no ques-
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tion but that defendant and Empey were the real parties in 
interest, and plaintiff was not entitled to any judgment what-
soever. 
Inferences are not sufficient to support a finding. Western 
Union Tel. Co. v. Mathews, 74 U., 280 Pac. 729. 
In Sayward v. Dexter-Horton & Co., 72 Fed. 758, 19 C. 
C. A. 176 it was said: "But it is not every contract for the 
benefit of a third person that is enforceable by the bene-
ficiary. ** The fact ** that the contract, if carried out ac-
cording to its terms, would inure to his benefit, is not suf-
ficient to entitle him to demand fulfillment. It must appear 
to have been the intention of the parties to secure to him 
personally the benefit of its provisions." 
Approved and affirmed in the Utah cases of Brown v. 
Markland, 16 Utah 360, 52 Pac. 597. Smith v. Bowman, 32 
Utah, 33, 88 Pac. 687. 
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REFUSAL TO 
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NON-SUIT AS A-
GAINST THE PLAINTIFF. 
Plaintiff admits throughout his· testimony that he had no 
negotiations with the defendant of any kind whatsoever before 
or at the time the contract was let. He makes some weak effort 
to show that in November, three months after the contract was 
made, that defendant saw him down town and "hollered at 
me", asking for a statement of labor and material. No one else· 
was present, and the claim is wholly self-serving. But even 
assuming that testimony to be true, which we do not, what 
bearing would that have on the contract? None whatsoever. 
Empey admits throughout his testimony that he carried on all 
of the negotiations with the defendant and says the defendant 
"called me to do it." Empey checked all the plans and specifi- 1 
cations with defendant and the general contractor, Isakson. 
He was asked about the price of $750.00 at that time. At no 
time in the discussions was plain tiff mentioned, even inferen-
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tially. Empey was asked if he had the pipe to do the work with, 
and he answered that he did. He didn't say his principal, the 
plaintiff, had the pipe, but said he had the pipe, so that at no 
place in the plaintiff's evidence is there any competent evidence 
whatsoever upon which a . finding could be made or which would 
support legally plaintiff's complaint, and the action should have 
been dismissed as ag~inst the plaintiff at the time he rested. 
From plaintiff's statements that the material went out of 
his store (all so far as the record shows without the knowledge 
of the defendant) and that Empey took it out to defendant's 
place of business and did the work, it does not follow that plain-
tiff had any claim upon the contract or the benefits thereof. 
The most that could have been shown by the evidence was that 
plaintiff was a materialman and might have been entitled to 
a lien had he sought one within time. He does not claim the 
trade name, Empey Electric Company, but admits that is the 
property of the· interpleaded plaintiff. He admitted that he was 
not licensed to contract; hence any effort on his part to do so 
was unlawful under 79-SA-1, Supra, and the permit from Ogden 
City to do the work, as well as the license from the State of 
Utah to contract, was in the name of Empey Electric Company. 
4. INSUFFICIENCY OF COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT OR WARRANT THE AMENDED FINDINGS OF 
FACT COMPLAINED OF. 
In the event this Honorable Court should find that there 
was some sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case or 
support or sustain the allegations of plaintiff's complaint at 
the time he rested his case, what evidence there was, if any, 
was certainly weakened; and it appears to us completely and 
effectually negatived by the evidence of the defendant. De-
fendant's evidence shows that during the latter part of july 
or thereabouts, 1946, Empey and the defendant discussed a 
contract to furnish all of the material and labor covered by the 
plans and specifications prepared by the general contractor at 
757 Washington Boulevard in Ogden. The plans and specifica-
tions wete on hand, including the contractor's estimate of 
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$750.00 for all of the electrical work to be done and the material 
therefor. Empey was advised that Goodsell had made a bid of 
$750.00 to do this work and furnish the material; that it later 
developed that Goodsell did not have sufficient pipe to do the 
job; that the contractor was ready to lay concrete and that the 
job had to be done immediately. Defendant asked Empey if he 
had the pipe to do the job. Empey answered that he did. He 
was shown the estimate of the general contractor for $750.00 
and was told that Goodsell had bid $750.00 on the job and this 
in the presence of the general contractor, Andrew Isakson. Up 
to this point there is no disagreement in the testimony between 
plaintiff, Empey and the defendant. Plaintiff was not present. 
The defendant says Empey agreed to take the con~ract to do 
the work and furnish the materials for a maximum of $750.00, 
saying that he thought he could save the defendant some money 
on the Goodsell bid and the general contractor's estimate. The 
general contractor, who was the only disinterested witness, cor-
roborated the defendant completely. The only conflict in the 
testimony is a general denial on the part of Empey that he 
agreed to take the contract at a maximum of $750.00, although 
he admits it was discussed; admits it was the general contractor's 
estimate; admits Goodsell's bid; and admits that he used the 
plans and specifications upon which· the estimate and the bid 
were made. 
Surely the great weight and preponderance of all the com-
petent evidence in the record is to the effect: 
A. That plaintiff was not the real party in interest. 
B. That Empey negotiated for and concluded the contract 
in his own name and in his own right and not as the agent, 
undisclosed or otherwise, of the plaintiff. 
C. That there was no assignment of the contract from 
Empey to plaintiff, and 
D. That the agreed upon price was a maximum of $750.00. 
,We fail to see how any other conclusion can be reached upon 
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the record, and yet the findings complained of are diametrically 
opposed to these conclusions and are not supported by or based 
upon any competent evidence sufficient to sustain the same. 
While this is a law case as distinguished from an equity case, yet 
this Honorable Court may determine on appeal alleged errors 
at law, "including the competency and sufficiency of evidence 
to support a verdict or findings as rendered or made." 
In re Yowell's Est., 75 U. 312, 285 P. 285, where this court, 
speaking through Elias Hansen, Justice, said: 
''The evidence adduced on behalf of the proponents 
was sufficient to sustain the findings. In such case we are 
not authorized to vacate them, unless we on the record are 
justified in holding, *** that the findings are so manifestly 
against the clear weight of the evidence as to indicate that 
it was not fairly or impartially considered by the court 
below, or that portions of it were arbitrarily rejeCted or 
disregarded, or that undue weight was given to other por-
tions of it, or that in considering the evidence and in 
reaching a conclusion as to the facts, the trial court mis-
conceived or misapplied the evidence, or was influenced 
through prejudice or bias." 
The above case turned upon the handwriting in a will 
sought to be probated. The evidence was about evenly balanced, 
except for expert testimony on handwriting, and this court held 
that kind of testimony "to be of weak and doubtful character 
as being of the lowest order of testimony" and that "unless 
reasons are given supporting the opinions expressed, is of little 
or no value", and held that it did not outweigh the evidence 
received upon which the findings attacked were based. 
In Western Union Tel. Co. v. Mathews, Supra, this court 
held in action at law, Supreme Court may review record for 
purpose of ascertaining whether the evidence supports the 
findings; and in Jensen v. Howell, 75 U. 64, 282 P. 1034, this 
court said that in law cases "the findings as a general rule are 
approved if there is sufficient competent evidence to support 
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them and, ordinarily, are not disturbed, unless it is manifest that 
they are so clearly against the weight of the evidence as to in-
dicate a misconception, or not a due consideration of it." 
It appears to the writer that this is that kind of case. 
This brings us to Question 5, the conclusions of law and 
the rendering of judgment in favor of the respondent and 
against the appellant. It goes without saying that if, as we 
have pointed out, the evidence is insufficient to sustain the 
findings assigned as error, that the judgment in favor of res-
pondent could not stand, because the judgment, if sustained at 
all, must be sustained upon those findings. Absent, it has no 
foundation or base. That being so, after the judgment had been 
entered, based upon the erroneous and unsupported findings 
Question No.6, a new trial should have been granted, and plain-
tiff's cause dismissed, and the issues should have been deter-
mined as between the defendant and the interpleaded plaintiff, 
Empey, which we think, based upon the evidence, would have 
resulted in judgment in favor of the interpleaded plaintiff in 
the sum of $750.00 less the reasonable value of necessary work 
and labor required to complete and correct the work undertaken 
by Empey, to-wit: $88.30, as shown by the witness, james M. 
Neill (Bill of Exceptions, Page 70), and less any offsets found 
by the court to exist in favor of -the defendant at least in the 
sum found in the amended judgment, to-wit: $137.23 or a total 
judgment in favor of Empey in a sum not in excess of $524.47, 
with interest and costs. 
We respectfully submit that this is the maximum judgment 
which should have been found against the defendant and that 
that judgment should (A) be in favor of the interpleaded plain-
tiff, Empey E'lectric Company, or (B) that if the plaintiff as an 
undisclosed principle is entitled to any judgment, it should not 
exceed that amount. 
Respectfully submitted, 
IRA A. HUGGINS 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
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